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Abstract— In many practical settings, the user needs to
retrieve information from a server in a periodic manner, over
multiple rounds of communication. In this paper, we discuss the
setting in which this information needs to be retrieved privately,
such that the identity of all the information retrieved until the
current round is protected. This setting can occur in practical
situations in which the user needs to retrieve items from the
server or a periodic basis, such that the privacy needs to be
guaranteed for all the items been retrieved until the current
round. We refer to this setting as an online private information
retrieval as the user does not know the identities of the future
items that need to be retrieved from the server.
Following the previous line of work by Kadhe et al. we
assume that the user knows a random subset of M messages
in the database as a side information which are unknown to
the server. Focusing on scalar-linear settings, we characterize
the per-round capacity, i.e., the maximum achievable download
rate at each round, and present a coding scheme that achieves
this capacity. The key idea of our scheme is to utilize the data
downloaded during the current round as a side information
for the subsequent rounds. We show for the setting with K
messages stored at the server, the per-round capacity of the
scalar-linear setting is C1 = (M + 1)/K for round i = 1
and Ci = (2
i−1(M + 1))/KM for round i ≥ 2, provided that
K/(M + 1) is a power of 2.
I. INTRODUCTION
The goal of the Private Information Retrieval (PIR)
schemes [1] is to enable a user to privately download, with
minimum cost, a message belonging to a database with
copies stored on a single or multiple remote servers, without
revealing which message it is requesting. In a single server
scenario, the entire database needs to be downloaded to
preserve the privacy of the requested message. However,
when the user has some side information about the database
[2]–[8], the information-theoretic privacy can be achieved
more efficiently than downloading the whole database.
In the PIR with side information setting, the user has
access to a random subset of the messages in the database
as a side information, which are unknown to the server. This
side information could have been obtained from other trusted
users or through previous interactions with the server. In this
setting, the savings in the download cost depend on whether
the user wants to protect only the privacy of the requested
message, or the privacy of both the requested message and
the messages in the side information.
To the best of our knowledge, all of the prior works on
the private information retrieval focus on the single message
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request. However, in many practical settings, the user needs
to retrieve multiple messages periodically, over a period of
time. For example, a user might retrieve a news item or
the stock market information on a daily basis. The key
requirement in such scenarios is to protect the identity of
all the requested messages up to the current round. By
leveraging previously downloaded messages, the user can
significantly reduce the number of bits that need to be
downloaded. Accordingly, in this paper we analyze both the
fundamental limits as well as the achievability schemes for
the multi-round PIR schemes. We refer to this setting as an
online private information retrieval as the user does not know
the identities of the future items that need to be retrieved
from the server.
A. Main Contributions
In this paper, we study the problem of single-server
online PIR with side information. In this problem,
a user wishes to download a sequence of messages
XW = {XW1 , XW2 , · · · , XWt} from a database X of K
messages, stored on a single server. The communication is
performed in rounds, such that at round i, the user wishes to
retrieve a message XWi for someWi ∈ [K]. We assume that
the user decides on which message Wi to request at round i
and that the identity of the future messagesWj , j > i are not
known at round i. We also assume that the user has access
to M messages which are selected uniformly at random and
whose identity are not known to the server.
We focus on the scenario where at round i, the user wishes
to protect the privacy of all the requested messages up to
round i, {W1, · · · ,Wi} for 1 ≤ i ≤ t. That is, after the user
makes a request to the server at round i, the server cannot de-
cide which of theK messages is more likely to get requested
at that round and at the previous rounds. Focusing on scalar-
linear settings, we characterize the per-round capacity, i.e.,
the maximum achievable download rate at each round. We
also present a scalar-linear coding scheme that achieves this
capacity. The key idea of our scheme is to utilize the data
downloaded during the current round as a side information
for subsequent rounds. We show for the setting with K
messages stored at the server and a random subset of M
messages available to the user at the first round, the per-round
capacity of the scalar-linear scheme is C1 = (M + 1)/K for
round i = 1 and Ci = (2
i−1(M + 1))/KM for round i ≥ 2,
provided that K/(M + 1) = 2l for some l ≥ 1.
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B. Related Work
The classical PIR problem with multiple servers each
of which stores the full copy of the database, has been
extensively studied [9]–[11]. The most relevant to our paper
is the line of work that focuses on setting with multiple
retrieved messages [8], [12], [13] as well as settings in which
the user access to certain files as side information before the
information retrieval process begins. The side information
settings have been studied in [2], [3] for the single server
setting and in [4]–[8] for the multi-server setting.
Kadhe et al. [2] have initiated the study of the single-
server single-message PIR with side information. The multi-
server single-message and the multi-server multi-message
PIR with side information problems, in the scenario where
the user wants to protect the privacy of both the requested
message(s) and the messages in the side information, are
studied in [7] and [8], respectively. Heidarzadeh et al. [3]
focused on a setting in which the side information is random
linear combination of a subset of messages.
To the best our knowledge, none of the prior works on the
private information retrieval focused on the online settings
in which the requests are issued one at a time such that the
identity of future requests are unknown.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND MAIN RESULTS
For a positive integer i, denote [i] , {1, . . . , i}. Let
Fq be a finite field of size q and Fqm be an exten-
sion field of Fq of size qm for some prime q ≥ 2
and m ≥ 1. We assume that there is a server stor-
ing a set X of K messages, X , {X1, . . . , XK}, with
each message Xi being independently and uniformly dis-
tributed over Fqm , i.e., H(X1) = · · · = H(XK) = L and
H(X1, . . . , XK) = KL, where L , m log2 q. We assume
that there is a user that wishes to retrieve a sequence of
messages XW = {XW1 , XW2 , · · · , XWt} from the server so
that at round i, the user wishes to retrieve the message XWi
for someWi ∈ [K]. We assume that the identity of the index
Wi of the message retrieved at round i is not known to the
user before round i.
We also assume that initially the user knows a random
subset XS of X that includesM messages for some S ⊂ [K],
|S|= M . We refer to Wi as the demand index at round i,
XWi as the demand at round i, and refer to S as the side
information index set, XS as the side information and M as
the size of the side information set.
Let S and Wi be random variables corresponding to S
and Wi, respectively. Denote the probability mass function
(pmf) of S by pS(·), and the conditional pmf of Wi given
S by pWi|S(·|·). We assume that S is uniformly distributed
over all subsets of [K] of size M , i.e.,
pS(S) =
1(
K
M
) , S ⊂ [K], |S|=M
and Wi’s are independent and uniformly distributed over
[K] \ S, i.e.,
pWi|S(Wi|S) =
{
1
K−M , Wi /∈ S
0, otherwise.
Also, we assume that the server knows the size of S (i.e.,
M ), the pmf pS(.) and pWi|S(.|.), but the realizations S and
Wi are unknown to the server a priori.
At round i, for any S andWi, in order to retrieveXWi , the
user sends to the server a query Q[Wi,S], and upon receiving
Q[Wi,S], the server sends to the user an answer A[Wi,S].
We define Q[W1:i,S] , {Q[W1,S], Q[W2,S], · · · , Q[Wi,S]} and
A[W1:i,S] , {A[W1,S], A[W2,S], · · · , A[Wi,S]} as the set of all
queries and answers up to the round i, respectively.
Note that the query at round i, Q[Wi,S] is a (poten-
tially stochastic) function of Wi,S, XS , Q
[W1:i−1,S], and
A[W1:i−1,S]. Similarly, the answer at round i, A[Wi,S] is a
(deterministic) function of Q[W1:i,S] and the messages in X ,
i.e.,
H(A[Wi,S]|Q[W1:i,S],X ) = 0.
The queries from the first round up to round i all together,
Q[W1:i,S] must protect the individual privacy for all the user’s
demand indices up to round i from the server, i.e.,
P(Wj = W
′|Q[W1:i,S],X ) =
1
K
for all W ′ ∈ [K] and all j ∈ [i]. This means that some
correlations between the demands in different rounds can be
revealed to the server, but all the demands up to round i must
be protected to be individually private at each round. This
condition is referred to as the privacy condition.
All the answers from the first round up to round i,
A[W1:i,S] along with the side information XS must enable the
user to retrieve the demand XWi . This condition is referred
to as the recoverability condition, as follows:
H(XWi |A
[W1:i,S], Q[W1:i,S],XS) = 0.
The problem of the single-server Online Private Informa-
tion Retrieval (OPIR) is to design a query Q[Wi,S] and an
answer A[Wi,S] for any given S and Wi at round i ≥ 1, that
satisfy the privacy and recoverability conditions.
The per-round rate of an OPIR algoirhtm at round i
denoted by Ri, is defined as the ratio of the entropy of a
message, i.e., L, to the maximum entropy of the answer at
round i, i.e.,
Ri = min
W1:i,S
L
H(A[Wi,S])
.
The per-round capacity of OPIR at round i denoted by Ci, is
defined as the supremum of rates over all OPIR algorithms
that achieve the capacity up to round i − 1. We focus on
scalar-linear capacity, which corresponds to the maximum
rate that can be achieved by scalar-linear protocols.
The goal of this paper is to establish the scalar-linear per-
round capability of the OPIR and present an algorithm that
achieves this capacity. Theorem 1 characterizes the capacity
of scalar-linear OPIR problem for the case when K
M+1 = 2
l
for some l ≥ 1.
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Theorem 1. For the OPIR problem with K messages, and
side information of size M , when K/(M + 1) = 2l for some
l ≥ 1, the scalar-linear per-round capacity at round i is
given by:
(1)Ci =
{
M+1
K
i = 1
2i−1(M+1)
KM
i ≥ 2
III. CONVERSE PROOF
In this section, we prove the converse part of Theorem 1.
Suppose that the user wishes to retrieve a sequence of
messages XW = {XW1 , XW2 , · · · , XWt} from the server so
that at round i, the user wants to download the message
XWi for some Wi ∈ [K], and knows XS for a given
S ⊆ [K] \W , |S|= M . By assumption, K/(M + 1) = 2l
for some l ≥ 1. At round i, for any S and Wi, in order to
retrieve XWi , the user sends to the server a query Q
[Wi,S],
and the server responds to the user by an answer A[Wi,S].
The answer A[Wi,S] at round i is a set of mi messages, i.e.,
A[Wi,S] , {yi,1, . . . , yi,mi}. In linear OPIR schemes each
message yi,j for 1 ≤ j ≤ mi is a linear combination of
the original messages in X , i.e.
yi,j =
∑
m∈[K]
γmi,jXm,
where γmi,j ∈ Fq are the encoding coefficients of yi,j .
We refer to the vector γi,j = [γ
1
i,j , γ
2
i,j , · · · , γ
K
i,j ] as the
encoding vector of yi,j . The i-th unit encoding vector
that corresponds to the original packet Xi is denoted by
ui = [u
1
i , u
2
i , · · · , u
K
i ], where u
i
i = 1 and u
j
i = 0 for
i 6= j. Consider the set of K linearly independent unit
vectors {u1, u2, · · · , uK} as a basis for a vector space V
of dimension K . Thus, the encoding vector of yi,j , i.e., γi,j ,
is a vector in the vector space V . Define the answer matrix at
round i, Ai, of dimension (mi ×K) with γij being the j-th
row of Ai. Note that the number of messages in A
[Wi,S],
or equivalently, the number of rows of matrix Ai is the
download cost at round i.
For the first round (i = 1), the proof of converse follows
from the prior results for PIR with side information (see [2,
Lemma 1]). It is easy to verify that at round 1, any optimal
scalar-linear scheme can be converted to the partition-based
scheme of [2] by row operations. The answer matrix A1
corresponding to the optimal scheme has exactly k/(M +1)
rows. Followed by a column permutation, the matrix A1 can
be represented as:
A1 =


M + 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
⋆ · · · ⋆ M + 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
⋆ · · · ⋆
. . . M + 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
⋆ · · · ⋆


K
M+1
×K
where ⋆’s indicate non-zero entries in matrix A1 and all other
entries in matrix A1 are zero. Each row of A1 corresponds
to one of the messages in the answer. For instance, the first
row corresponds to X1 + · · ·+XM+1, the second row cor-
responds to XM+2 + · · ·+X2M+2, and so on. The support
set of each message in the answer is called a partition. Thus,
the optimal scheme in the first round has n = K/(M + 1)
number of partitions, denoted by {P1, P2, · · · , Pn}.
For the second round and after that (i ≥ 2), in Theorem 2
we prove that the maximum entropy of the answer, i.e.,
H(A[Wi,S]), where the maximum is taken over all Wi and
S, is lower bounded by KM/(2i−1(M + 1)).
Theorem 2. The maximum entropy of the answer
H(A[Wi,S]) at round i ≥ 2 over all Wi and S, is lower
bounded by KM/(2i−1(M + 1)).
Proof: For linear schemes it is sufficient to prove that
the maximum number of rows of matrix Ai for i ≥ 2 is
lower bounded by KM/(2i−1(M + 1)). The proof is based
on an inductive argument and uses a simple yet powerful
observation, formally stated in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. For any i, W1:i, S, and any W
⋆ ∈ [K], there
must exist S⋆ ⊆ Pj , |S
⋆|= M and W ⋆ * Pj for some
j ∈ [n] such that
H(XW⋆ |A
[W1:i,S], Q[W1:i,S],XS⋆) = 0.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix.
Lemma 2. At round i for i ≥ 2, in the vector space spanned
by the rows of matrices A1, A2, · · · , Ai, corresponding to
any W ⋆ ∈ [K], there must exist a vector which is a linear
combination of at mostM+1 messages including XW⋆ itself
and at most M other messages which are a subset of XS⋆ ,
a potential side information for XW⋆ defined in Lemma 1.
Proof: The proof is based on contradiction. Assume that
at round i, for i ≥ 2, in the vector space spanned by the
rows of matrices A1, A2, · · · , Ai, for a given W
⋆ ∈ [K],
there does not exist such a vector described in Lemma 2.
This means that XW⋆ is not recoverable from A
[W1:i,S] and
XS⋆ , which contradicts the result of Lemma 1.
In fact, in the vector space spanned by the rows of
A1, A2, · · · , Ai, there must exist K of such vectors, one for
each potential value of W ⋆ ∈ [K]. Define matrix Γ with
these K vectors being as the rows of Γ. An instance of
matrix Γ would be as follows:
Γ =
R {
L {


W ⋆︷︸︸︷
1
S⋆︷ ︸︸ ︷
⋆ ⋆ · · · ⋆
1 ⋆ ⋆ · · · ⋆
. . .
⋆ ⋆ · · · ⋆ 1
⋆ ⋆ · · · ⋆ 1


K×K
Lemma 3. The rank of matrix Γ is lower bounded by K/2.
3
Proof: Since by Lemma 1, S⋆ ⊆ Pj for some j ∈ [n] and
W ⋆ * Pj , then S⋆ is either in the left side of W ⋆, or in the
right side of W ⋆ in each row of matrix Γ. Accordingly, the
rows of matrix Γ can be classified into two types: L and R,
based on the criteria that S⋆ is in the left side of W ⋆, or in
the right side of W ⋆, respectively. Let z1 and z2 denote the
number of rows of type L and the number of rows of type R,
respectively. It is easy to verify that the maximum of z1 and
z2 is greater than or equal to K/2, i.e., max(z1, z2) ≥ K/2.
Without loss of generality, assume max(z1, z2) = z1. Then,
z1 ≥ K/2. By removing z2 rows of type R from matrix Γ,
we are left with z1 ≥ K/2 rows of type L that constitute a
matrix of size z1×K , in which there exists a lower triangular
submatrix of size z1 × z1 and rank z1 ≥ K/2. Thus, the
rank of matrix Γ is at least z1 which is lower bounded by
K/2.
For the second round (i = 2), we need to show that
the number of rows of matrix A2 is lower bounded by
KM/(2(M + 1)). Based on Lemma 2, in the vector space
spanned by the rows of matrices A1 and A2, there must
exist all K rows of matrix Γ which based on Lemma 3 is
of rank greater than or equal to K/2. On the other hand, as
mentioned earlier, the optimal scheme in the first round is
partitioning where each row of A1 corresponds to a linear
combination ofM+1 messages. One can readily confirm that
corresponding to any M +1 number of linearly independent
rows of matrix Γ, there exists at most one linear combination
of these rows in the rows of matrix A1. Thus, there must exist
at least M linearly independent combinations of these rows
in the rows of matrix A2. Then, we have:
rank(A2) ≥
M
M + 1
×rank(S) ≥
M
M + 1
×
K
2
=
KM
2(M + 1)
In other words, matrix Γ has at least K/2 number
of linearly independent rows. Thus, there exist at most
K/(2(M + 1)) linearly independent combinations of these
rows in the rows of matrix A1. Therefore, there must exist
at least K/2−K/(2(M + 1)) = KM/(2(M + 1)) linearly
independent combinations of these rows in the rows of matrix
A2, which indicates that the number of rows of matrix A2
is lower bounded by KM/(2(M + 1)). The optimal scheme
achieves the lower bound. Thus, in the optimal scheme, the
number of rows of matrix A2 is exactly KM/(2(M + 1)).
For the third round (i = 3), we need to show that
the number of rows of matrix A3 is lower bounded by
KM/(4(M + 1)). Based on the Lemma 2, in the vector
space spanned by the rows of matrices A1, A2 and A3,
there must exist all K rows of matrix Γ which based on
Lemma 3 is of rank greater than or equal to K/2. By the
same reasoning as in the case of i = 2, corresponding to any
2(M +1) number of linearly independent rows of matrix Γ,
there exist at most two linearly independent combinations
of these rows in the rows of matrix A1. On the other
hand, we showed that A2 in the optimal scheme is of rank
KM/(2(M + 1)), which shows that corresponding to any
2(M + 1) number of linearly independent rows of matrix
Γ, there exist at most M linearly independent combinations
of these rows in the rows of matrix A2. Thus, there must
exist at least 2(M + 1)− 2−M = M linearly independent
combinations of these rows in the rows of matrix A3. Then,
we have:
rank(A3) ≥
M
2(M + 1)
× rank(S) ≥
KM
4(M + 1)
In other words, matrix Γ has at least K/2 num-
ber of linearly independent rows. Thus, there exist
at most K/(2(M + 1)) linearly independent combina-
tions of these rows in the rows of matrix A1, and
KM/(4(M + 1)) linearly independent combinations of
these rows in the rows of matrix A2. Therefore, there must
exist at least K/2−K/(2(M + 1))−KM/(4(M + 1)) =
KM/(4(M + 1)) linearly independent combinations of
these rows in the rows of matrix A3, which indicates that
the number of rows of matrix A3 is lower bounded by
KM/(4(M + 1)).
Using the same proof technique and similar reasoning as
in the cases of i = 2 and i = 3, it can be shown that
the number of rows of Ai for i ≥ 2 is lower bounded by
KM/(2i−1(M+1)). By the result of Lemma 2, in the vector
space spanned by the rows of matrices A1, A2, · · · , Ai, there
must exist all K rows of matrix Γ, which is of rank greater
than or equal to K/2 (by Lemma 3). Again, similarly as in
the cases of i = 2 and i = 3, it follows that corresponding to
any 2i−2(M+1) number of linearly independent rows of ma-
trix Γ, there exist at most 2i−2, 2i−3M, 2i−4M, · · · ,M , lin-
early independent combinations of these rows in the rows of
matrix A1, A2, A3, · · · , Ai−1, respectively. Thus, there must
exist at least 2i−2(M + 1)− (2i−2)− (
∑i−3
j=0 2
j)M =M
linearly independent combinations of these rows in the rows
of matrix Ai. Then, we have:
rank(Ai) ≥
M
2i−2(M + 1)
×
K
2
=
KM
2i−1(M + 1)
which shows that the number of rows of matrix Ai is lower
bounded by KM/(2i−1(M + 1)).
IV. ACHIEVABILITY SCHEME
In this section, we propose an OPIR protocol for arbitrary
K and M where K/(M + 1) = 2l for some l ≥ 1,
which achieves the rate (M + 1)/K in the first round and
(2i−1(M + 1))/KM at rounds i ≥ 2. The proposed scheme,
referred to as the Online Partitioning (OP) Protocol, is
described in the following.
Each round of the OP protocol consists of four steps:
Round i = 1:
Step 1: The user creates a partition of the K messages
into n1 , K/(M +1) sets. The first partition, P
1
1 is formed
by combining the demand and the side information set S:
P 11 , {W1} ∪ S. The user randomly partitions the set of
messages [K] \ P 11 into n1 − 1 sets, each of size M + 1,
denoted as P 12 , · · · , P
1
n1
.
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Step 2: The user sends to the server a uniform random
permutation of the partition {P 11 , · · · , P
1
n1
}, i.e., it sends
{P 11 , · · · , P
1
n1
} in a random order.
Step 3: The server picks an arbitrary Cauchy matrix
of size K × (Ml + 1) denoted by C , [ci,j ] with pa-
rameters from Fq , where q ≥ K +Ml+ 1. For a subset
P ⊂ [K], let VP denote the characteristic vector of the
set P , which is a vector of length K such that for all
i ∈ [K], its i-th entry is ci,1 if i ∈ P , otherwise it is
0. The server computes the answer A[W1,S] as a set of n1
inner products given by A[W1,S] = {AP 1
1
, · · · , AP 1
n1
}, where
AP = [X1, · · · , XK ] · VP for all P ∈ {P
1
1 , P
1
2 , · · · , P
1
n1
}.
Step 4: Upon receiving the answer from the server,
the user decodes XW1 by subtracting off the contribu-
tions of its side information XS from AP for some
P ∈ {P 11 , P
1
2 , · · · , P
1
n1
} such that W1 ∈ P .
Round i ≥ 2:
Step 1: Based on the OP protocol at round i − 1, the
user sends to the server a uniform random permutation of a
partition of the K messages into ni−1 number of sets as the
query, i.e., Q[Wi−1,S] = {P i−11 , P
i−1
2 , · · · , P
i−1
ni−1
}. Given the
query at round i−1, i.e., Q[Wi−1,S] and givenWi and S, the
user creates a partition of K messages into ni =
ni−1
2 sets
{P i1, P
i
2, · · · , P
i
ni
}. It should be noted that ni−1 is always
divisible by 2 based on the assumption that K/(M + 1) is
a power of 2. It is easy to confirm that Wi and S belong
to two different partitions at round i − 1. Assume, without
loss of generality, that Wi ∈ P
i−1
1 and S ∈ P
i−1
2 . Then,
the user constructs P i1 = P
i−1
1 ∪ P
i−1
2 . For constructing each
P i ∈ {P i2, · · · , P
i
ni
}, the user chooses two partitions from
the remaining partitions at round i− 1 uniformly at random
(without replacement) and unions them.
Step 2: The user sends to the server a uniform random
permutation of the partition {P i1, P
i
2, · · · , P
i
ni
}, i.e., it sends
Q[Wi,S] = {P i1, P
i
2, · · · , P
i
ni
} in a random order.
Step 3: The server extracts a submatrix H = [hij ]K×M
of the Cauchy matrix C which contains all
rows and j-th column of the matrix C, where
(i− 2)M + 2 ≤ j ≤ (i− 1)M + 1. For a subset P ⊂ [K],
let GP = [gij ]K×M denotes the characteristic matrix of
the set P , which is a matrix of size K ×M such that for
each j ∈ [M ], for all i ∈ [K], gij = hij if i ∈ P , otherwise
it is zero, i.e., gij = 0 for i /∈ P . The server computes
AP = [X1, · · · , XK ] · GP for all P ∈ {P
i
1, P
i
2, · · · , P
i
ni
}.
In fact, AP = [(AP)1, · · · , (AP )M ] is a row vector of
length M that gives M linearly independent combinations
of the messages Xi for i ∈ [P ]. Finally, the server
computes the answer A[Wi,S] as a set of ni ×M linearly
independent combinations of the messages, i.e., A[Wi,S] =
{(AP i
1
)1, · · · , (AP i
1
)M , · · · , (AP i
ni
)1, · · · , (AP i
ni
)M}.
Step 4: Upon receiving the answer from the server, the
user retrieves XWi by subtracting off the contributions
of its side information XS from A
[W1:i,S] and solving a
set of 2i−2(M + 1) linearly independent equations with
2i−2(M + 1) unknowns. It should be noted that every sub-
matrix of a Cauchy matrix is itself a Cauchy matrix, which
guarantees the existence of 2i−2(M + 1) linearly indepen-
dent equations.
Lemma 4. The OP protocol satisfies the recoverability
and individual privacy conditions, while achieving the rate
(M + 1)/K at first round, and the rate (2i−1(M+1))/KM
at round i ≥ 2.
Proof: The OP protocol for the first round is based
the Partition and Code PIR Scheme which satisfies the
recoverability and the privacy conditions and achieves the
rate (M + 1)/K [2]. It should be noted that in the first
round, the coefficients of the messages in the answer which
are chosen according to a Cauchy matrix, have no effect on
the recoverability and the privacy proofs.
In the OP protocol at round i ≥ 2, the answer
A[Wi,S] consists of niM = KM/(2
i−1(M + 1))
linear combinations of the messages in X , i.e.,
A[Wi,S] = {(AP i
1
)1, · · · , (AP i
ni
)M}. Since the messages
in X are uniformly and independently distributed over
Fqm , and {(AP i
1
)1, · · · , (AP i
ni
)M} are linearly independent
combinations of the messages, then {(AP i
1
)1, · · · , (AP i
ni
)M}
are uniformly and independently distributed over Fqm , i.e.,
H((AP i
1
)1) = · · · = H((AP i
ni
)M ) = m log2 q = L, and
H(A[Wi,S]) = H((AP i
1
)1) + · · ·+H((AP i
ni
)M ) = niML.
Therefore, the rate of the OP protocol at round i ≥ 2 is
equal to L/H(A[Wi,S]) = (2i−1(M + 1))/KM .
From the step 4 of the OP protocol for round i ≥ 2, it can
be easily verified that the recoverability condition is satisfied
because of choosing the coefficients from a Cauchy matrix.
To prove that the OP protocol satisfies the privacy
condition at round i ≥ 2, we need to show that
P(Wj =W ′|Q[W1:i,S], X) = 1K for all W
′ ∈ [K] and all
j ∈ [i]. Since the OP protocol does not depend on the
contents of the messages in X , then it is sufficient to prove
that P(Wj = W ′|Q[W1:i,S]) = 1K for all W
′ ∈ [K] and all
j ∈ [i]. Thus, for j = i, we have:
P(Wi =W
′|Q[W1:i,S])
=
∑
S⋆
(P(Wi =W
′|Q[W1:i,S],S⋆)× P(S⋆|Q[W1:i,S])
where the sum is over all possible S⋆ of size M , a
potential side information for Wi = W
′. Let assume W ′ is
located in the kth partition of round i, i.e. P
i
k. As mentioned
earlier, at round i ≥ 2, each partition is a union of two
partitions at round i− 1. Without loss of generality assume
that, kth partition of round i (of size 2
i−1(M + 1)), is a
union of wth and vth partitions of round i − 1 (each of
size 2i−2(M + 1)), i.e., P ik = P
i−1
w ∪ P
i−1
v , and W
′ is
located in the P i−1w . A possible potential side information
S⋆ for Wi = W
′, would be a subset of P i−1v of size M
which is completely located in one of the partitions of the
first round. P i−1v of size 2
i−2(M + 1), is a union of 2i−2
partitions of the first round. From each partition of the first
round, all subsets of size M , i.e.,
(
M+1
M
)
, can be considered
as possible S⋆. Thus, one can consider 2i−2
(
M+1
M
)
number
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of possible potential side information S⋆ for Wi = W
′. For
a specific S⋆ = Sˆ, given that S⋆ = Sˆ belongs to P i−1v ,
each of the elements in P i−1w (of size 2
i−2(M + 1)) can
be user’s demand index with the same probability. In other
words, P(Wi = W ′|Q[W1:i,S],S⋆ = Sˆ) = 12i−2(M+1) .
The probability of a specific S⋆ = Sˆ given Q[W1:i,S],
can be computed by the application of the total probability
theorem and chain rule, we have:
P(S⋆ = Sˆ|Q[W1:i,S])
=
∑
j∈[ K
M+1
]
P(S⋆ = Sˆ|Q[W1:i,S],S⋆ ∈ P 1j )× P(S
⋆ ∈ P 1j |Q
[W1:i,S])
where the potential side information S⋆ belongs to
each of the partitions of the first round with the same
probability, i.e., P(S⋆ ∈ P 1j |Q
[W1:i,S]) = M+1
K
for all
j ∈ [ K
M+1 ]. In each partition of the first round, there are(
M+1
M
)
subsets of size M , each of which can be the po-
tential side information S⋆ with the same probability. Thus,
P(S⋆ = Sˆ|Q[W1:i,S],S⋆ ∈ P 1j ) =
1
M+1 , for one j ∈ [
K
M+1 ]
and zero for others. Thus, we have:
P(S⋆|Q[W1:i,S]) =
1
M + 1
×
M + 1
K
Finally, P(Wi = W ′|Q[W1:i,S]) is obtained as follows:
P(Wi = W
′|Q[W1:i,S])
=
∑
S⋆
(P(Wi = W
′|Q[W1:i,S],S⋆)× P(S⋆|Q[W1:i,S])
= 2i−2(M + 1)×
1
2i−2(M + 1)
×
1
M + 1
×
M + 1
K
=
1
K
.
We proved that P(Wi = W ′|Q[W1:i,S]) = 1K for all
W ′ ∈ [K]. Using the same proof technique, for j ∈ [i − 1],
it can be shown that P(Wj = W ′|Q[W1:i,S]) = 1K for all
W ′ ∈ [K].
Example 1. (OP Protocol) Assume that the server has
K = 12 messages {X1, X2, · · · , X12}, and the user has
M = 2 messages, X2 and X3, as side information, i.e.,
S = {2, 3}. Consider a scenario as follows:
First round: The user demands the message X1, i.e.,
W1 = 1. Thus, the user labels 4 sets of size 3 as P
1
1 , · · · , P
1
4 .
Next, the user constructs P 11 = {W1,S} = {1, 2, 3} and
randomly partitions the set of remaining messages into
P 12 , P
1
3 , P
1
4 sets. Assume the user has chosen P
1
2 = {4, 5, 6},
P 13 = {7, 8, 9}, P
1
4 = {10, 11, 12}. Then, the user sends
to the server a random permutation of {P 11 , · · · , P
1
4 }. The
server picks an arbitrary Cauchy matrix C = [cij ]12×5 with
parameters over F17 as follows:
C =


7 13 6 9 1
3 7 13 6 9
5 3 7 13 6
15 5 3 7 13
2 15 5 3 7
12 2 15 5 3
14 12 2 15 5
10 14 12 2 15
4 10 14 12 2
11 4 10 14 12
8 11 4 10 14
16 8 11 4 10


The server sends back to the user four coded packets as:
Y1 = 7X1 + 3X2 + 5X3,
Y2 = 15X4 + 2X5 + 12X6,
Y3 = 14X7 + 10X8 + 4X9,
Y4 = 11X10 + 8X11 + 16X12,
The user can retrieve X1 by replacing the values of X2 and
X3 in Y1. From the server’s perspective, the user’s demand is
in one of the four partitions {P 11 , · · · , P
1
4 } with probability
1
4 , and in each partition, each of the indices is the user’s
demand index with probability 13 . Thus, the probability that
each of the indices i ∈ [12] being as a demand index would
be the same, i.e., P (W1 = i|Q
[W1=1,{2,3}]) = 112 = PW1(i).
Second round: The user demands the message X4, i.e.,
W2 = 4. Based on the OP protocol, the user labels 2 sets
of size 6 as P 21 , P
2
2 . Since W2 = 4 ∈ P
1
2 and S ∈ P
1
1 ,
the user constructs P 21 = P
1
1 ∪ P
1
2 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}.
For constructing P 22 , the user chooses the remaining two
partitions of round 1, i.e., P 13 and P
1
4 , and unions them, i.e.,
P 22 = P
1
3 ∪ P
1
4 = {7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12}. Then, the user sends
to the server a random permutation of {P 21 , P
2
2 }. Based on
the extracted submatrix H of the selected Cauchy matrix C,
the server constructs 2 linearly independent combinations of
the messages with indices in each partition {P 21 , P
2
2 }, and
sends back to the user four coded packets as follows:
Z1 = 13X1 + 7X2 + 3X3 + 5X4 + 15X5 + 2X6,
Z2 = 6X1 + 13X2 + 7X3 + 3X4 + 5X5 + 15X6,
Z3 = 12X7 + 14X8 + 10X9 + 4X10 + 11X11 + 8X12,
Z4 = 2X7 + 12X8 + 14X9 + 10X10 + 4X11 + 11X12.
The user has already downloaded X1 from the first round.
Thus, from the answers of the first and second rounds, the
user can retrieve X4 by solving a set of three linearly
independent equations with three unknown as follows:
15X4 + 2X5 + 12X6 = Y2,
5X4 + 15X5 + 2X6 = Z1 − 13X1 − 7X2 − 3X3,
3X4 + 5X5 + 15X6 = Z2 − 6X1 − 13X2 − 7X3.
From the server’s perspective, given the queries Q[W1:2,S]
and all the packets, the probability that each of the indices
i ∈ [12] being as a user’s demand index in the second round
would be the same and can be calculated as follows:
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P(W2 = i|Q
[W1:2,S], X)
=
∑
S⋆
(P(W2 = i|Q
[W1:2,S], X,S⋆)× P(S⋆|Q[W1:2,S], X))
= 3×
1
3
×
1(
3
2
) × 1
4
=
1
12
.
Also, from the server’s perspective, given the queries
Q[W1:2,S] and all the packets, the probability that each of
the indices i ∈ [12] being as a user’s demand index in the
first round is the same, i.e., P(W1 = i|Q[W1:2,S], X) = 112 .
This means that the scheme is individually private and from
the server’s perspective, the user’s demand index in the first
round will remain private after round 1.
Third round: The user demands the message X7, i.e.,
W3 = 7. Based on the OP protocol, the user labels 1 set
of size 12 as P 31 . Since W3 = 7 ∈ P
2
2 and S ∈ P
2
1 , the
user constructs P 31 = P
2
1 ∪ P
2
2 = {1, 2, · · · , 12}. Based
on the selected Cauchy matrix C, the server constructs 2
linearly independent combinations of all the messages, and
sends back to the user the following two coded packets:
T1 =
∑12
i=1 ci4Xi,
T2 =
∑12
i=1 ci5Xi.
The user has already downloaded X1 from the first round
and X4, X5, and X6 from the second round. Thus, from
the answers of the first, second and third rounds, the user
can retrieve X7 by solving a set of six linearly independent
equations with six unknown as follows:
14X7 + 10X8 + 4X9 = Y3,
11X10 + 8X11 + 16X12 = Y4,
12X7 + 14X8 + 10X9 + 4X10 + 11X11 + 8X12 = Z3,
2X7 + 12X8 + 14X9 + 10X10 + 4X11 + 11X12 = Z4,∑12
i=7 ci4Xi = T1 −
∑6
i=1 ci4Xi,∑12
i=7 ci5Xi = T2 −
∑6
i=1 ci5Xi.
From the server’s perspective, given the queries Q[W1:3,S]
and all the packets, the probability that each of the indices
i ∈ [12] being as a user’s demand index would be the same
and can be calculated as follows:
P(W3 = i|Q
[W1:3,S], X)
=
∑
S⋆
(P(W3 = i|Q
[W1:3,S], X,S⋆)× P(S⋆|Q[W1:3,S], X))
= 6×
1
6
×
1(
3
2
) × 1
4
=
1
12
.
Also, from the server’s perspective, in the second round
the demand of the first round and the demand of the second
round remains private, i.e., P(W1 = i|Q[W1:3,S], X) = 112
and P(W2 = i|Q[W1:3,S], X) = 112 .
APPENDIX
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
If there does not exist any S⋆ such thatXW⋆ is recoverable
from A[W1:i,S] and XS⋆ , then the server knows that W
⋆
cannot be the user’s demand index, and this violates the
privacy condition. Given the optimal scheme in the first
round, if there exists a S⋆ * Pj for some j ∈ [n], such
that XW⋆ is recoverable from A
[W1:i,S], Q[W1:i,S] and XS⋆ ,
then the server knows that S⋆ cannot be the user’s side
information index set. Thus,W ⋆ cannot be the user’s demand
index, and this violates the privacy condition.
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